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Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of monetary policy in presence of heterogeneous 
consumers. We study the effectiveness (quantitative effects) of monetary policy and 
equilibrium determinacy properties of a New Keynesian DSGE model where a fraction of 
households cannot smooth consumption. We show that two-demand regimes can emerge 
(according to the “slope” of IS curve) and that the main unconventional results, stressed by 
recent literature, only hold in the unconventional case of an IS curve positively sloped. 
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1. Introduction 
Following a strand of recent literature, this paper aims to study the effectiveness 
and the stability properties of different monetary policy rules in a New Keynesian 
DSGE model augmented by a fraction of agents who do not smooth consumption 
(i.e. spenders). We aim to show that the main unconventional results derived by 
recent literature only hold under some particular circumstances.   
Agents who do not smooth consumption can be interpreted in various ways. One 
can view their behavior as resulting from consumers who face binding borrowing 
constraints. Alternatively, myopic deviations from the assumption of fully rational 
expectations should be assumed (rule-of-thumb), i.e. consumers naively 
extrapolate their current income into the future, or weigh their current income too 
heavily when looking ahead to their future income because current income is the 
most salient piece of information available.
1  
Whatever the reason why some agents do not smooth consumption, their 
analytical modeling is however similar and for this reason we will generically 
refer to rule-of-thumb consumers to include both categories of non-smoothing 
consumers. 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991) provide compelling evidence for the 
empirical existence of heterogeneous consumers. If we specifically refer only to 
households who can smooth consumption (savers) and agents whose current 
consumption equals current income (spenders), spenders’ behavior is 
quantitatively important, with about one-fourth of income accruing to them in the 
United States (see Fuhrer, 2000).
2  
Spenders have been extensively used to analyze fiscal policy issues; they play a 
crucial rule in breaking the Ricardian equivalence, for this reason, savers and 
spenders are often referred as Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers.
3 More 
                                                 
1 See Mankiw (2000) and references therein. 
2 Muscatelli  et al. (2006) find an even larger proportion. They suggest that about 37% of 
consumers are spenders, whilst 84% of total consumption in steady state is given by optimizing 
consumers; spenders account for about 59% of total employment. Additional evidence is provided 
by Jappelli (1990), Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999) and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004). 
3 See e.g. Mankiw (2000) and Muscatelli et al. (2006) and references therein. Christiano et al. 
(2005) investigate the effects of a rule-of-thumb behavior in firms’ decisions   2
recently, Amato and Laubach (2003), Galì et al. (2004) and Bilbiie (2004)
4 have 
introduced spenders (modeled as rule-of-thumb consumers) in a New Keynesian 
framework to study monetary policy. They show that the presence of spenders’ 
behavior may alter dramatically the properties of the standard model and overturn 
some of the conventional results.  
In particular, Amato and Laubach (2003) study optimal monetary policy and find 
that monetary policy effectiveness increases in the fraction of spenders. Galì et al. 
(2004) explain how the Taylor principle becomes a sufficient but non necessary 
condition for stability when monetary policy is set according to a Taylor rule. By 
contrast, in the case of forward-looking interest rate rules, Galì et al. (2004) show 
that the conditions for a unique equilibrium are somewhat different from the usual 
ones. Bilbiie (2004) shows that the difference between the economic performance 
of the pre- and post-Volker’s era can be explained in terms of a New Keynesian 
model augmented with rule-of thumb consumers. 
By using a simplified version of Galì et al. (2004) we are able to study the 
effectiveness and the stability properties of different monetary policy rules under 
rule-of-thumb consumers from an analytical point of view rather than considering 
calibrations/simulations as in previous works.
5 We find that some important and 
unconventional results derived by aforementioned authors only hold under some 
particular circumstances related to the demand regimes, defined according to the 
response of aggregate demand to nominal interest rate movements.  
Specifically, we assert that models with rule-of-thumb consumers are associated 
with two different demand regimes. In a standard regime an increase of the 
interest rate, everything equal, reduces inflation and output as usual. By contrast 
in an inverse regime the contrary occurs. In short, an increase in the nominal 
interest rate may increase output since deflation and falls in markups make real 
wages to rise, thus inducing spenders to consume more.  
We find that many of the results obtained by the recent literature, as e.g. the 
impact of Taylor rules in Galì et al. (2004), only hold in the inverse regime. Thus 
                                                 
4 We share some results with Bilbiie (2004, 2005). Unluckily both of us recognize our common 
interests at a late stage of our research agenda. 
5 An exception is Bilbiie (2005).   3
rule-of-thumb consumers can explain some empirical puzzle, but the explanation 
comes at the cost of an additional puzzle, i.e. a positively sloped IS curve, which 
summarizes the positive relation between aggregate demand and the interest rate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section outlines our basic 
framework and describes the two demand regimes implied by the presence of 
spenders and their implications for monetary policy. Section 3 investigates the 
stability of the model under different monetary policy rules and discusses the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Basic Framework and Demand Regimes
6 
We consider a simple New Keynesian model augmented by non-Ricardian 
consumers (Galì et al., 2004). In order to simplify the analysis and draw attention 
to the demand-side effects of spenders’ behavior, we do not consider any capital 
accumulation process. We assume a continuum of infinitely-lived heterogeneous 
agents normalized to one. Savers are a fraction 1 λ − , they consume and 
accumulate wealth as in the standard setup. The remaining fraction agents λ  is 
instead composed by spenders who do not own any asset, cannot smooth 
consumption and thus consume all their current disposable income.  
By solving the inter-temporal optimization problems of savers and spenders, 
aggregating and then log-linearizing,
7 we obtain the following description of the 
demand side of the economy:   
(1)  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 tN t t t t t N t t ci E E c E λζ πλ ζ ω + ++ =− − − + − ∆ , 
(2)  tt t yn ω υ =+ , 
                                                 
6  A large part of the model is rather standard (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; or 
Woodford, 2003). Thus here the model is only described in its main equations. The demand side of 
the economy is derived in more detail in Appendix A since it plays a crucial role. A technical 
appendix with a full-model derivation is available upon request: 
7 Notice that Gali et al. (2004) log-linearized the saver and spender consumption around the steady 
state aggregate consumption. By contrast, we log-linearized the Saver and Spender consumption 
around their steady state levels and then we aggregate them. Although both procedures are correct 
and equivalent (leading to the same final results), the procedure followed by Gali et al. (2004) 
hides some crucial features of the transmission mechanism.      4
Equation (1) is the aggregate consumption, it represents a modified version of the 
standard consumption Euler equation, where  t c  is consumption,  t i  is the nominal 
interest rate,  t π   is the inflation rate.  () ()
1 11
N ζ υκ κ
− =+ +   is the steady state 
share of spenders’ consumption, where the parameter υ   is the inverse of the 
Frisch labor supply elasticity. Our Euler equation differs from the standard one in 
which the last term of the right hand side of equation (1) is absent. This is due to 
the presence of savers, which establish a link between the demand for goods and 
the real wage  t ω   (see equation (2)). The variables  t y  and  t n  are  respectively 
aggregate output and employment.  
The supply side of the economy is represented by a standard forward-looking 
Phillips curve, a labor demand and a markup equation:
 8 
(3)  1 tt tt t Ek x u π βπ + =+ + , 
(4)  () tt t t mc y n ω =+ −  
(5)  () 1 tt mc x υ =+  
where  tt t x ya =−  is the output gap with respect to the flexible-price output, 
which coincides with the exogenous technology shock,  t a . The variable  t u  is 
(1) AR  process representing the standard exogenous cost-push shock. Equation (4) 
is firms’ aggregate labor demand. Equation (5) is the equation for real marginal 
costs. 
By considering the log-linearized production function  , tt x n =  aggregate 
consumption can be written as  
(6)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11 tN t t t t t N t t N t ci E E c E x a λζ π λζ υ λζ + ++ + =− − − + − + ∆ − ∆ . 
Current consumption depends on real interest rate (because of the Euler inter-
temporal substitution effect), expected future consumption, and on the output-gap 
expected growth.  
After some more algebra, equation (4) can finally be re-written as: 
(7)  ( ) 11 1 tt t t t t t x Ex i E a π + ++ =− Ω − + Ω ∆ , 
                                                 
8 The production function is Yt = AtNt, the labor demand simply equates the real wage to the 









−+ Ω=  is the income monetary multiplier, i.e. the semi-elasticity of 
real output to the real interest rate.
9  
Equation (7) is similar to the standard one proposed by the New-Keynesian 
literature, the existence of spenders however affects the impact of interest rate 
policy on aggregate demand from both a quantitative and a qualitative point of 
view. According to the sign of the income multiplier, equation (7) individuates 
two different regimes:  
1.  A standard regime holds if the income monetary multiplier is positive. 
Such a regime is dominated by the hypothesis of life-cycle permanent 
income and thus by the consumption smoothing theory (see e.g. Clarida, et 
al. 1999).  
2.  An inverse regime holds if the income monetary multiplier is negative and 
it is dominated by the liquidity-constraint effect. An increase in real 
interest rates is expansionary and interest rate cuts imply contractions 
since a large part of consumers cannot access to financial markets and 
saving.  
Aggregate consumption (6) negatively depends on real interest rates but positively 
on the current output by the aggregate income elasticity of consumption. Thus if 
the income elasticity of consumption is low, the monetary multiplier will be 
negative. By contrast, if the elasticity is high, the multiplier is positive. The 
intuition of the result can be found in the labor-market dynamics. Consider an 
increase of the interest rate that reduces the savers’ demand for consumption 
goods, which prefer to consume more tomorrow, it also shifts left the labor 
demand curve pressing the wage downward (equation (4)). Given that savers 
decide to decrease consumption demand for leisure increases and therefore savers 
labor supply decreases, (see equation (2)).
10 The net effect of labor and demand 
                                                 
9 It should be noticed that neither the share of spenders’ consumption nor the Frisch elasticity 
depends on the fraction of spenders (see Appendix B). 
10 Note that employment of spenders does not rise in a demand-driven boom because we have 
assumed a logarithmic functional form for the consumer’s instantaneous utility (see also Galì et al., 
2004; or Muscatelli et al., 2006). A different form (e.g. constant relative risk aversion) eliminates 
the inelasticity of spenders’ labor supply, but does not affect our main conclusions. Although this 
inelasticity is a drawback of the model, the logarithmic functional form greatly helps to simplify 
the exposition.   6
supply on the real wage depends on the extent of the inverse Frisch elasticity and 
the spenders’ fraction. If the elasticity and the savers’ fraction are large, the net 
effect is negative: a wage reduction follows. The wage reduction further 
stimulates demand falls because also non-Ricardian decreases their consumption 
and further falls in the real wage, so that the standard regime holds. A reverse 
result holds when the proportion of savers is low: a real wage increase follows, so 
that spenders, which are sensible to real wage movements, increase their 
consumption. Given that the proportion of spenders is high an increase in the 
interest rate increase the aggregate output, and the IS-curve is positive sloped (the 
inverse regime holds).  
Formally, the two regimes

















otherwise we are in the liquidity-constrained regime. The parameter 
() ( )
1 10 1 θη η
− =− ∈ ,  indicates the inverse of the firms markup, where η  is the 
elasticity of substitution across differentiated products.  
For relatively low values of θ  and high values of κ , the threshold value is greater 
than one ( 1 λ
∗ > ). In such a case, only the standard regime occurs since  [ ] 0,1 λ∈ . 
In other terms the inverse Frisch elasticity is smaller then one. For relatively high 
values of θ  and low values of κ , the liquidity-constrained regime can emerge. In 
addition, if θ  is greater than 05 . , λ
∗ is always smaller than one. Thus, in such a 
case, the liquidity-constraint regime always holds for a value of λ  sufficiently 
great.  
We can now discuss on the effectiveness of monetary policy. In the standard 
regime the effectiveness, which is measured by the size of the income monetary 
multiplier, is increasing in the fraction of spenders. By contrast, in the liquidity-
constrained regime, its effectiveness is decreasing in λ . The effectiveness of 
                                                 
11  The inverse Frisch elasticity and the steady state fraction of spenders depend on the deep 
parameters: the intermediate sector elasticity of substitution and the labor disutility coefficient. 
12 The following condition implies that income elasticity of consumption is smaller than one. It is 
obtained by considering that the steady state value of N is θ (κ+θ)
-1 (see the Appendix B).   7
monetary policy is represented in the figure 1, where the absolute value of income 
monetary multiplier,  Ω , vis-à-vis the fraction of spenders, λ , is plotted.  
Figure 1  
Notice that without non-Ricardian consumers, as  0 λ → ,  1 Ω →− , thus elasticity 
of real output to the real interest rate is minus one, i.e. as in the standard case with 
logarithmic utility. In such a case, a positive correlation between expected 
consumption growth and real interest rate is found. As long as λ  increases the 
effectiveness of monetary policy raises till Ω =+ ∞  (the income elasticity of 
consumption is equal to one). For λ λ
∗ >   the regime shifts to the liquidity-
constrained one (where there is a negative correlation between expected 
consumption growth and real interest rate), an interest cut affects positively real 
output and the effectiveness of monetary policy is decreasing in the fraction of 
spenders, i.e. λ .
13  
Summarizing, if the IS curve is positive sloped monetary policy effectiveness 
increases in the fraction of spenders (as Amato and Laubach, 2003). A reverse 
result is obtained if the IS curve is negative sloped. 
 
3. Taylor Principle and Determinacy
14 
3.1. Monetary policy based on Taylor rules 
A description of monetary authority behavior completes the model above-
presented. Monetary policy can be introduced by an exogenous rule, which relates 
the interest rate to the other variables, or by an endogenous one, directly derived 
by the solution of an optimization problem, e.g. welfare maximization. One 
fundamental property which is requested for the monetary authority behavior is to 
support rational expectation equilibrium determinacy.  
Let us start by considering an exogenous Taylor rule as the following:
15 
                                                 
13 Of course, for values of θ and κ implying λ
*>1, only the first (decreasing) part of the figure is 
economically relevant. 
14 Determinacy conditions are derived in Appendix C.   8
(9)  12 ttt ix α πα =+, 
where  1 α  and  2 α  are both positive.  







The above determinacy condition has a simple usual interpretation. A feedback 
rule satisfies the Taylor principle if in the event of a sustained increase in the 
inflation rate by one percentage point, the nominal interest rate will eventually be 
raised by more than one percentage point. Each percentage point of permanent 
increase in the inflation rate implies an increase in the long-run average output 
gap of ()
1 1 k β
− −  percent. An exogenous Taylor rule thus conforms to the Taylor 
principle if and only if its coefficients satisfy  ( )
1
12 11 ak a β
− + −>  (see, among 
others, Woodford, 2004).  
In the liquidity-constrained regime, Ω   is negative. Hence, to simply the 
exposition, we redefine it as Ω=− Ω, which is a positive measure of monetary 
policy effectiveness. Determinacy thus requires 
(11)  12 2
12 1








>−, − − ⎨ ⎬
Ω ⎩⎭
 or  
(12)  12 2
12 1




















By inspecting equation (11) we find that a rule satisfying the Taylor Principle can 
be not sufficient to assure determinacy and a more aggressive rule, i.e. a rule that 
strongly react to current inflation, may be requested. By inspecting equation (12), 
a passive policy as indicated by condition (12) implies determinacy, but if both 
values between brackets or the r.h.s. of the last term are negative the equilibrium 
is always indeterminate. This occurs if the central bank places a high weight to the 
output stabilization. 
                                                                                                                                      
15 John Taylor has proposed that U.S. monetary policy in recent years can be described by an 
interest-rate feedback rule as that considered here. See, among others, Taylor (1993) or Woodford 
(2004).   9
In the standard regime, the Taylor principle is thus the necessary and sufficient 
condition for determinacy. By contrast, in the liquidity-constrained regime, we 
have to consider different cases. More in detail, determinacy may be related to the 
monetary policy effectiveness as follows.
16  










Taylor principle is a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. 










Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for determinacy but not necessary 
since also a non-aggressive (with respect to inflation) state contingent 
policy implies determinacy.  










the Taylor principle is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
determinacy; in fact, a more aggressive policy than the one satisfying the 
Taylor principle leads to determinacy. This is however a sufficient 
condition only, since all the other rules that does not satisfy it lead to 
determinacy in a sort of inverse Taylor principle.     
The economic intuition of our results will be clearer after describing the case on 
an endogenous-Taylor rule and the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
the liquidity-constrained regime.  
The effects of the rule-of-thumb consumer on the equilibrium determinacy are 
depicted in the following figure.
17 
Figure 2 
The figure replicates and amends the discussion of Gali et al. (2004). They show 
the relationship between the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers and the inverse 
of the Taylor rule inflation coefficient, 1/α1 (or α1 as in panel (b), (d)) which 
guarantees determinacy. Figure 2 shows only the inverse regime, because, as 
                                                 
16 See appendix C. 
17 Our parameterization is similar to Gali et al. (2006), we impose an equilibrium steady state for 
employment of about 1/3. We have used: β = 0.99; η = 6, κ = 1.7. Results do not change under 
other realistic values for parameters.   10
stated by Gali et al. (2004) important results only apply in this regime. Panel (a) 
and (c) represent the sufficient conditions for determinacy in case of the two 
monetary policy regimes: a very aggressive and a passive monetary policy, 
respectively (cf. figure 1 in Gali et al., 2004). Panel (b) and (d) represent the same 
conditions in terms of the inflation coefficient instead of the inverse inflation 
coefficient as panel (a) and (c). The reason why we consider both representations 
will be clear soon. 
Panel (a) reproduces the Gali et al.’s results: as the fraction of rule-of-thumb 
consumers increases, a more aggressive monetary policy is required in order to 
guarantee the stability. It is however clear from panel (b) that the coefficients 
required for stability grows exponentially with the fraction of rule-of-thumb 
consumers, making this case true for a narrow realistic parameterization.
18 By 
contrast, stability also emerges in the case of a non aggressive policy and requires 
more plausible values of the parameters, e.g. they can be consistent with the 
coefficients estimated for the case of the pre-Volker policies.  
Although the Taylor rules of the above-described kind are frequently used, 
monetary policy rules consistent with loss minimization are often presented as 
forward-looking. Formally, in such a case, the central bank should follow an 
optimal path for the nominal interest rate satisfying:   
(13)  31 tt iE α π + = . 
where the coefficient  3 α  is determined by the monetary policy regime where the 
central bank act and the parameters of central bank loss. Equation (11) is usually 
derived from the solution of an optimization problem
19 and thus represents a sort 
of endogenous (forward-looking) Taylor rule.  
                                                 
18 In other words, in the neighborhood of the lower value of λ
*, we need an interest rate rule that is 
more aggressive than the Taylor prescription. However, when the value of λ is lower than λ
* the 
standard Taylor principle holds, while when the value of λ is greater than λ
* the degree of 
aggressiveness of the central bank increases. In the latter case, also small increases in λ with 
respect to λ
* imply a monetary policy unrealistically aggressive with respect to inflation.   
19 More in detail, equation (11) is derived from the so-called flexible inflation targeting approach 
(Svensson, 1999, 2003) under different monetary policy regimes (i.e. discretion, commitment or 
timeless perspective). It can be also seen as the results of utility-based welfare maximization 
(Woodford, 2003: Ch. 6). However, to generalize our results to such a case one should show that 
the central bank’s loss parameters (and thus α3) are independent of the spenders’ fraction. An 
analysis of the utility based welfare criterion is beyond the scope of the present paper thus we stick   11







∈, + ⎜⎟ Ω ⎝⎠
. 
Equation (12) is standard and nests the Taylor principle: monetary policy should 
respond more than one-for-one to increases in inflation, and should also not be too 
aggressive as noticed by Bernanke and Woodford (1997).  







∈− , ⎜⎟ Ω ⎝⎠
. 
Monetary policy has now to be conducted by a sort of inverted Taylor Principle. 
The central bank should respond less than one-to-one to increases in inflation. 
However, too much passive monetary policies may also lead to indeterminacy. In 
particular, if monetary policy has relatively high effectiveness, 
1 2 k
β+ Ω> , 
indeterminacy may also derives from a weak (positive) reaction to expected 
inflation of the nominal interest rate, i.e. 
( ) 21
3 1 k a
β+
Ω <− .  
The rational of the inverse Taylor principle is as follows. A positive non-
fundamental shock in the expectations reduces the real interest rate; in the 
liquidity-constrained regime, if monetary policy is passive, it does not lead to the 
self-fulfillment of expectation since output falls. By contrast if monetary policy is 
set according to the Taylor principle, the real interest rate will increase as well as 
output and expectations will be self fulfilled.   
Figure 2 synthesizes the above results in the parameter space. Panel (a) ((b)) refers 
to a relatively low (high) fraction of non-Ricardian consumers. In the standard 
regime, (white area) the Taylor Principle always holds. In the liquidity constraint 
regime we must distinguish between two type of monetary policy effectiveness: a 
relatively low effectiveness (dark area) and a relatively high one (light area). In 
the dark area, although an inverted Taylor principle holds, monetary policy leads 
to determinacy. By contrast, in the light area, even if an inverted Taylor principle 
                                                                                                                                      
us to the interpretation of equation (11) as an optimal policy derived from an exogenous loss as e.g. 
Evans and Honkapohja (2005), i.e. flexible inflation targeting approach.    12
still holds a very non-aggressive (with respect to inflation) monetary policy leads 
to indeterminacy.  
Figure 3 
In the standard regime, if the policy rule is not active, a non-fundamental increase 
in expected inflation generates an increase in the current output gap and, by the 
current Phillips curve, inflation increases, validating the initial non-fundamental 
expectation. The Taylor principle is needed to guarantee determinacy since an 
active rule generates a fall in output gap and thus in actual inflation, contradicting 
initial expectations. By contrast, in a liquidity-constrained regime, if the policy 
rule is active, a non-fundamental increase in expected inflation generates an 
increase in the current output gap and an increase in inflation (by the Phillips 
curve), validating the initial non-fundamental expectation. Thus, in such a regime, 
the Taylor principle leads to indeterminacy, instead a passive policy rule is 
requested. If the central bank follows a passive policy rule, a non-fundamental 
increase in expected inflation is associated with a fall in the real interest rate, a fall 
in the output gap, and deflation, contradicting the initial expectation that are hence 
not self-fulfilling.  
Our result is consistent with Galì at al (2004). It is worth noticing that, by 
comparing our results to those of Gali et al. (2004), the introduction of capital 
accumulation does not qualitatively affect the determinacy requirements. 
However, differently from Galì et al (2004), our model stresses the key element of 
the determinacy analysis: the demand regimes (i.e., the IS curve slope).  
 
3.2. Model calibration  
By considering the model (1)-(5) and the Taylor rule (9), (for the sake of 
simplicity, we assume a2 = 0), we simulate the effects of a unit standard deviation 
cost push and unit standard deviation technology shock in the two different 
demand regimes. Table 1 shows the parameters used.
20 
                                                 
20 Parameters are similar to Gali et al. (2004). Labor disutility is chosen to have a steady state 
value for N equal to about 1/3. In Galì et al (2004) the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal 
to one. This is compatible with a log specification of the households’ utility function, as the one 
we use to show the main results. Nevertheless, our results survive to more complex specifications, 
including utility with consumption habits, details are available upon request.    13
Table 1 
The impulse response functions (IRFs) to these shocks are represented in figure 4.  
Figure 4 
Panel (a1) and (b1) refer to the standard regime (the cases of a cost push shock 
and a technology shock, respectively); panels (a2)-(b2) and (a3)-(b3) refer instead 
to the inverse regime. 
As shown in figure 4 (a1) and (b1), in the standard regime the IRFs correspond to 
the ones of the standard New Keynesian model. The nominal interest rate follows 
the Taylor principle and implement an interest rate rule with a1>1.  
By contrast, in the inverse regime, i.e., with a positive sloped IS, in order to 
guarantee determinacy, two interest rate rule can be implemented: 
•  a very passive monetary policy; 
•  a rule which should be even more aggressive than what established by the 
Taylor principle.  
Figure 4 (a2)-(a3) and (b2)-(b3) describe IRFs with a Central Bank which follows 
the two different rules.  As shown in (a3) after a cost-push shock hits the economy 
the nominal interest rate can increases less the increase in the inflation rate. In fact, 
with a fraction of rule-of-thumb consumer equal to 0.73, in order to guarantees 
determinacy, it is necessary a1 < 0.008 or a1 >2.04.  In particular, it is worth 
noticing that with a very aggressive monetary policy, as in (a2), households 
expect that inflation decreases on impact instead of increasing, this means that 
monetary policy should decrease the nominal interest rate instead of increasing it 
in order to not generate self-full filling deflation.  
A similar mechanism holds in response of a positive technology shock. In the case 
of a very aggressive monetary policy, as in (b2), monetary policy should be very 
accommodating, households expect that inflation increases on impact instead of 
decreasing; this means that monetary policy should increase the nominal interest 
rate instead of decreasing it in order to not generate self-full filling inflation. 
Otherwise, as shown in (b3) after a positive technology shock hits the economy 
monetary policy is accommodating but the nominal interest rate can decrease less 
the decrease in the inflation rate.    14
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper introduces consumers’ heterogeneity into a DSGE New Keynesian 
model and considers the quantitative effects of monetary policy (effectiveness) 
and studies the equilibrium determinacy properties. By assuming that a fraction of 
consumers cannot smooth consumption, we show that two-demand regimes can 
emerge (according to the slope of the IS curve) and that some unconventional 
results on monetary policy effectiveness and equilibrium determinacy, recently 
stressed by macroeconomic literature, are only associated to the unconventional 
regime where the IS curve is positively sloped. 
By considering the liquidity-constrained agents, we find that if the slope of the IS 
is negative, monetary policy effectiveness increases in the fraction of spenders. 
The rationale of the result is as follows, although a smaller fraction of savers 
reduces the effects of interest rate policy on the inter-temporal allocation of 
consumption, the greater fraction of spenders increases the effects of monetary 
policy by the variations in spenders’ consumption. By contrast, in the liquidity-
constrained regime, the reverse effect holds. 
Regarding determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium, as long as the IS 
slope is conventional, standard results hold. Otherwise determinacy may be 
guaranteed by a passive monetary policy and the standard Taylor principle can be 
denied. More in details, in the liquidity-constrained regime, results on 
determinacy can be summarized as follows.  
1.  If monetary policy is set according to a standard Taylor rule, the Taylor 
principle is only a sufficient condition for determinacy when monetary 
policy is relatively effective whereas a more aggressive central bank is 
needed if the monetary policy has a (relative) low effectiveness. However, 
irrespectively of the policy effectiveness, determinacy can also be 
achieved by a (relative) non-aggressive policy, which clearly does not 
satisfy the Taylor principle.   15
2.  If the central bank supports an (optimal) dynamic relationship between 
output and expected inflation, determinacy requires a non aggressive 
central bank (i.e. a monetary policy that does not satisfy the Taylor 
principle) but not too much, since, in such a case, a non-fundamental 
increase in expected inflation needs an higher interest rate to be not self-
fulfilling. 
Finally, we want to stress that if the liquidity-constrained regime matters, 
determinacy needs to be studied with attention by policymakers, who must take 
into account of the regime where they are since a good policy for a regime can be 
explosive in the another one. A possible additional factor explaining the explosion 
of bubbles in emerging markets could be related to attempt of managing the 
monetary policy according to rules designed for developed financial markets in 
economy where the financial market were not fully developed. This provocative 
reflection however is rather preliminary and need of more empirical verifications.  
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Appendix A – The demand side 
Representative consumers are indexed by R  (Ricardian) and N  (non-Ricardian), 
they maximize the following utility functions:
21 
                                                 
21 To compare our results to the ones of Gali et al. (2004) and Bilbiie (2004, 2005) we do not 
consider real money balances. The introduction of real money balances will in fact imply possible 
additional channels of monetary transmission by the liquidity effects. The study of these effects is 
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where  () 01 β ∈, is the discount factor,  t C  represents household consumption at 
time t, while  t N  is labor. 
j φ  is a binary variable such that when jR = , 1
R φ =  
and when j N = , 0
N φ = . We assume the following logarithmic instantaneous 
utilities,  () ln ln 1
jj
ti ti uC N κ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ .= + −  with  0 χ >  and  0 κ > . By solving their 
optimization problems, consumers face the budget constraints: 
11 (1 )
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, where  t W  is the nominal wage at time 
t , and  t Π   is profit sharing. Note that real wages are the only source of 
fluctuations of non-Ricardian disposable income, and therefore, they are subject to 
a static budget constraint, while savers (Ricardian consumers) are the only ones 
facing a dynamic constraint.  
By solving the Ricardian and non-Ricardian representative consumers’ 
maximization problems, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 
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Equations (a.2) and (a.3) are the optimal consumption for Ricardian (i.e. inter-
temporal stochastic consumption Euler equation) and non-Ricardian consumers 
(who consume the whole labor income). Equation (a.4) is; the optimal condition 
for the labor supply. From equations (a.3) and (a.4), it is easy to find that non-
Ricardian consumers supply a fixed quantity of labor, i.e.  1
1
N
t N κ + = . 
The aggregate consumption and employment are 
(a.5)  () 1
RN
tt t CC C λ λ =− +   
(a.6)  () 1
RN
tt t NN N λλ =− +  
From equations (a.4) and (a.6), we obtain the wage aggregate supply:    17










By log-linearizing equation (a.7) we obtain equation (2), recall that  tt YC =  in 
equilibrium. By log-linearizing equations (a.2) and (a.3) we find:
22 
(a.8)  () 1
RN
tR t N t cc c λζ λ ζ =− +  
(a.9)  ( ) 11
RR
ti t tt t ci E E c π ++ =− − +   
(a.10) 
N
tt t cw p =− 
Solving equation (a.8) for 
R
t c   and using equations (a.9) and (a.10) we obtain 
equation (1). 
 
Appendix B – Demand Regimes 
This appendix shows the independence between the income monetary multiplier 
and the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. We need to relate the fraction of 
steady state fraction of non-Ricardian consumption and the inverse Frisch 
elasticity only to deep parameters. 
Regarding the former, from the demand side of the economy, i.e. equations (a.3) 
and (a.8), we obtain  () ()
1 1 11
NN CC ζ υκ κ
− − == + + , recall that Ricardian 
consumers supply a fixed amount of labor.  
To find the steady state value of the employment, we introduce the supply side of 
the economy, but since it is rather standard we will briefly discuss it (a technical 
appendix is available upon request). As usual, we consider an economy composed 
by a continuum of firms (indexed by  [ ] 0,1 z∈ ) producing differentiated 
intermediate goods with a constant return to scale technology  () () tt t Yz A Nz = . 
Intermediate goods are used as inputs by a perfectly competitive final goods firm. 
In such a context, under flexible prices, firms real marginal costs, are constant and 
equal to the inverse of firm mark-up:  
                                                 
22 Note that, differently from Galì et al (2004), saver and spender consumption have been log-
linearized around their steady state levels and not around the steady state level of aggregate 
consumption. The different log-linearization does not affect the result on the demand regimes.   18
(b.1)  ()
1 1 θη η
− =− . 
Moreover, given the constant return to scale technology and the aggregate nature 
of shocks, real marginal costs are the same across the symmetric intermediate 
good producing firms. Accordingly, from the cost minimization, real marginal 
cost is:  
(b.2) 
1
tt t t MCA W P
− = . 
By equating equations (a.8) and (b.2), we obtain that in the steady state: 
(b.3)  ()
1 N θ κθ
− =+, 
which is independent of the fraction of spenders.  
By numerical analysis it is found that for combinations of relatively low values of 
θ  and high values of κ  only the standard regime holds. By contrast, the liquidity-
constraint regime is then more likely to be observed for relative high values of θ  
and λ , and relative low values of κ .  
 
Appendix C – Determinacy 
Determinacy is studied by augmenting the log-linearized dynamic system (3)-(6) 
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Stability depends on the eigen-structure of the following matrix: 
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By indicating with  ( ) D .  and  () T .  the determinant and trace operators, we have: 
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23 In order to investigate the stability properties we do not need to look at the stochastic part that is 
thus omitted for the sake of brevity. We assume stationary disturbance processes.   19
The eigen-structure of matrix M  is studied as in Woodford (2003: Appendices to 
Chapter 4). Since the analysis of the standard regime does not differs from 
Woodford (2003), we only consider the liquidity-constrained regime, determinacy 
requires either: i) ()1 DM > , i.e.  ( )
1 1
12 1 aa k β
− − ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ <− − Ω ,  () () 10 DM TM ±+ >  
or ii)  11 () () 1 0 DM TM ±+ < . 
Being:  
(c.4)  ()() ( ) { }
1
21 () () 1 2 1 1 1 DM TM a a k β ββ
− ++ = + − Ω + + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
(c.5)  ( ) ( )
1
21 () () 1 1 1 DM TM a ka β β
− −+ = − Ω − + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   
from equations (c.4) and (c.5) we derive conditions (11) and (12), respectively.  
By considering a rule (13), in a similar manner as above, the dynamic system is 
governed by the following matrix: 







⎡ − Ω− Ω− ⎤
= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
 
I t  i s  e a s y  t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  
1 () 1 , DM β
− = >  stability  requires  11 () () 1 DM TM ±> −  
and  11 () () 1 DM TM ±< − .  11 () () 1 DM TM ± <−   is never satisfied; by contrast, 
11 () () 1 DM TM ±> −  requires condition (15).  
Regarding the relationship between determinacy and effectiveness of monetary 

































































































.   20
From conditions 1a) and 2a) follow that a standard Taylor principle holds for a 
relatively high effectiveness a more aggressive principle should be used for a 











































































 and condition 2b is always binding. 
Summarizing (as described in the main text): 















>−  (Taylor principle).  



























   (strong inverse 
Taylor principle, a very non-aggressive (to inflation) policy implies the 
equilibrium determinacy).  






















   (strong Taylor principle, a more 






<−   (inverse Taylor principle). 
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Table 1 – Model calibration  
Parameters  Values  Description of the Parameters   
β    0.99 Depreciation  rate   
η    6  Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods   
υ     0.5  Inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity 
φ    0.75  Fraction of firms that leave their price unchanged   
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(a2) (b2) 
(a3) (b3) 
Figure 4 
 
 